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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 15-3538 
_________________ 
 
JOAN LONGENECKER-WELLS; KENNETH DODSON; GENEVIEVE REGAL; 
BENJAMIN HUFFNAGLE; NICHOLAS DANKOSKY, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
BENECARD SERVICES INC, d/b/a Benecard PBF; BENECARD CENTRAL FILL OF 
PA, LLC; BENECARD MARKETING, LLC; NATIONAL VISION 
ADMINISTRATORS, LLC; CONTACT FILL, LLC 
_________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 1-15-cv-00422) 
District Judge:  Hon. William W. Caldwell 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 25, 2016 ) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
  
 
                                                 
 Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed senior status on July 18, 2016. 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s judgment granting Benecard Services, Inc.’s 
(“Benecard”) motion to dismiss.  Because we agree that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is 
barred by Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine, and that their breach of implied 
contract claim fails to pass muster under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we 
will affirm. 
I.1 
 This case arises from an illegal data breach of Benecard’s computer system.  
Benecard is a prescription benefit administration services company that provides mail 
and specialty drug dispensing, managed vision services, and contact lens mail services to 
public and private sector organizations.  Plaintiffs are former employees and customer 
members of Benecard who provided Benecard with their full names, dates of birth, 
addresses, and social security numbers as a prerequisite to employment or use of 
Benecard’s services.  Benecard also maintained Plaintiffs’ personal financial information, 
including W-2 tax forms. 
 In early 2015, unknown third parties breached Benecard’s computer system and 
gained access to Plaintiffs’ personal and confidential information.  Plaintiffs suffered 
financial harm when these unknown third parties used Plaintiffs’ information to file 
fraudulent tax returns and the IRS issued tax refunds to the unknown third parties rather 
than to Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs filed this putative class action diversity lawsuit on behalf of 
                                                 
1 Because this appeal arises out of the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we 
assume the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint are true.  See Gould Elec. Inc. v. United 
States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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all former and current Benecard employees and customer members whose information 
was compromised by the data breach.  Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence and 
breach of implied contract under Pennsylvania law. 
 In granting Benecard’s motion to dismiss, the District Court held that 
Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine barred Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and that 
Plaintiffs’ breach of implied contract claim failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  
This appeal followed. 
II.2 
 A.  Negligence 
 Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine provides that “no cause of action exists for 
negligence that results solely in economic damages unaccompanied by physical injury or 
property damage.”3  This doctrine “is concerned with two main factors: foreseeability and 
limitation of liability.”4  The District Court held that because Plaintiffs’ negligence claim 
sounds only in economic loss resulting from the fraudulent tax returns filed with their 
information, the economic loss doctrine bars their claim.  We agree. 
                                                 
2 The District Court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over the 
grant of a motion to dismiss.”  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
3 Excavation Techs., Inc. v. Columbia Gas Co. of Pa., 985 A.2d 840, 841 n.3 (Pa. 2009) 
(quoting Adams v. Copper Beach Townhome Communities, L.P., 816 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2003)). 
4 Adams, 816 A.2d at 307. 
 4 
 
 Plaintiffs contend that the “contours of the economic loss doctrine have been 
broadened and muddied” by virtually all courts that have considered the issue.5  They ask 
us to “right the ship” by interpreting it as a bar only against negligence claims that flow 
from a contract. 6   They argue that, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the doctrine in Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio,7 
the doctrine applies “only in cases where the source of the duty plaintiff seeks to enforce 
arises from a contract and, even then, only in instances where the harm suffered is limited 
to economic loss arising from the interference with contractual expectation.”8   They 
maintain that because their negligence claim does not arise from a contractual duty, but 
rather a common law duty grounded in public policy, the economic loss doctrine does not 
bar their claim.  We have rejected this argument before and, without contrary guidance 
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, will do so again here. 
 In Bilt-Rite, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a negligence action 
against an architectural firm that provided faulty building plans to a school with 
knowledge that the plans would be used by prospective contractors.9  The contractor, 
relying on the faulty plans, spent more money than it had anticipated and sued the 
architectural firm for negligent misrepresentation under Section 552 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  Section 552 imposes a duty of care on suppliers of professional 
                                                 
5 Pl. Reply Br. 2. 
6 Id. at 1.  
7 866 A.2d 270 (Pa. 2005). 
8 Pl. Br. 12. 
9 Bilt-Rite, 866 A.2d at 272-73. 
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information for use by others. 10   The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
contractor could recover purely economic damages in this instance.11   
 Plaintiffs read the Bilt-Rite court’s interpretation of the economic loss doctrine as a 
bar to negligence claims only when the alleged duty owed to the plaintiff flows from a 
contract or, pursuant to the exception the court carved out, when the harm resulted from 
plaintiff’s reliance on the harm-causing party’s expert advice.  We have rejected this 
argument in this past.  In Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, we explained that 
“Bilt-Rite did not hold that the economic loss doctrine may not apply where the plaintiff 
has no available contract remedy.”12  Rather, “the Bilt-Rite Court simply carved-out an 
exception to allow a commercial plaintiff to seek recourse from an ‘expert supplier of 
information’ with whom the plaintiff has no contractual relationship” when loss resulted 
from reliance on the expert’s information.13  Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
recently confirmed that the economic loss doctrine “generally precludes recovery in 
negligence actions for injuries which are solely economic,” but does not apply to “claims 
of negligent misrepresentation under § 552.”14  Likewise, in Azur v. Chase Bank, we 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the economic loss doctrine was inapplicable to his 
                                                 
10 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977). 
11 Bilt-Rite, 866 A.2d at 288. 
12 533 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2008). 
13 Id.  
14 Excavation Techs., 985 A.2d at 841. 
 6 
 
negligence claim because he had no contractual remedy.15  As that court stated, “we 
already rejected an identical argument in Sovereign Bank.”16 
 With this case law as our guide, we decline to hold that Pennsylvania’s economic 
loss doctrine is inapplicable here simply because Plaintiffs are not in contractual privity 
with Benecard and thus have no contractual remedy.  While we note that the case law on 
Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine can be read in several different ways, we decline 
to “right the ship” as Plaintiffs here suggest.  That task, if necessary, is for the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, not this Court. 
 B.  Breach of Implied Contract 
 Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that Benecard breached an implied contract by 
failing to adequately safeguard Plaintiffs’ confidential information.  The implied contract 
allegedly arose when Plaintiffs entrusted Benecard with confidential information as a 
condition of employment or doing business with the company.  We agree with the 
District Court that under Rule 12(b)(6), these allegations do not sufficiently state a claim. 
 An implied contract arises in the same manner as an express contract, except that 
the parties’ intention, “instead of being expressed in words, is inferred from acts in the 
light of the surrounding circumstances.”17  That is, the agreement is inferred from the 
conduct of the parties.  Though intent can be gleaned from the parties’ “ordinary course 
                                                 
15 601 F.3d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 2010). 
16 Id. 
17 Liss & Marion P.C. v. Recordex Acquisition Corp., 983 A.2d 652, 659 (Pa. 2009) 
(quoting Elias v. Elias, 237 A.2d 215, 217 (Pa. 1968)). 
 7 
 
of dealing[s],”18 “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” fail to state an 
actionable claim.19   
 Here, Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts supporting their contention that an 
implied contract arose between the parties other than that Benecard required Plaintiffs’ 
personal information as a prerequisite to employment.  This requirement alone did not 
create a contractual promise to safeguard that information, especially from third party 
hackers.  By way of contrast, in Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., the plaintiff’s breach of implied 
contract claim survived a motion to dismiss when he pled that Coca-Cola, “through 
privacy policies, codes of conduct, company security practices, and other conduct, 
implicitly promised to safeguard his [personal information] in exchange for his 
employment.”20  Plaintiffs here do not plead any company-specific documents or policies 
from which one could infer an implied contractual duty to protect Plaintiffs’ information.  
Merely claiming that an implied contract arose “from the course of conduct”21 between 
Plaintiffs and Benecard is insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not err in 
granting Benecard’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence and breach of implied 
contract claims.  We will therefore affirm. 
                                                 
18 Id. (quoting Ingrassia Const. Co. v. Walsh, 486 A.2d 478, 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). 
19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
21 J.A. 39 ¶ 84. 
